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Abstract
The accounting principle of decomposing hybrid financial instruments into their deriva-
tive and non-derivative components is widely accepted as it results in a consistent treat-
ment of hybrid instruments and economically equivalent combinations of contracts. Non-
contingent derivatives and their economic equivalents, on the other hand, are not treated
accordingly under the mixed accounting model underlying IAS 39. The conventional
criticism regarding unequal treatment of economic equivalents refers to the creation of
opportunities for earnings management. The aim of this paper is to add another perspec-
tive by also discussing the effects of the related disclosure rules on risk perception by
capital market participants. For this purpose we consider both the presentation on the
balance sheet and the additional disclosure in the notes according to IFRS 7. From extant
literature, we diligently develop the hypothesis that, due to availability effects, entities
using non-contingent derivatives are perceived to be riskier than entities using economic
equivalents, although in fact the latter are riskier due to their exposure to additional coun-
terparty risk. This bias in the perception of disclosures might thereby alter an entity’s
costs of capital in a way not intended by IAS 39. In particular, we expect individuals to
valuate entities using non-contingent derivatives lower than identical entities using eco-
nomically equivalent contracts instead. We expect this difference in valuation to result
from a higher cognitive availability of negative associations with derivatives than with
non-derivatives. The underlying assumptions are outlined as they build a framework of
hypotheses that could be tested in future research, particularly in experimental studies.
1 Introduction
According to the IFRS Conceptual Framework, the fundamental objective of reporting
under IFRS is to provide economic agents with information to support their ability to
make economic decisions. Consistency therefore should be the reference when assessing
accounting rules under IFRS (see Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2007). Consistency means
that like economic situations are shown in the same manner: The economic characteris-
tics of an accounting issue are of greater importance than the purely legal or contractual
form (Moxter, 2003, p. 335). A good example for consistent accounting rules is pro-
vided by the accounting for embedded derivatives under IAS 39. The decomposition of
a hybrid financial instrument consisting of an embedded contingent derivative and a non-
derivative instrument into its individual components is mandatory. As a result, a certain
hybrid instrument and an exact replication of its economic structure by separate individual
contracts are measured and disclosed following the same principles (see Ernst & Young,
2006, p. 1085, and IAS 39.BC37). While it is also possible to replicate non-contingent
derivatives, such as swap agreements or forwards, by means of non-derivative financial in-
struments, the accounting rules for those cases are less consistent. Non-contingent deriva-
tives, according to IAS 39.9, have to be accounted for at fair value through profit and loss,
whereas their replications by non-derivatives can be measured at cost, at fair value through
profit and loss or at fair value through equity. This inconsistency is generally described
as mixed accounting model and prominently assessed in the international literature (see
Bradbury, 2003; Bromwich, 2004; Gebhardt et al., 2004; Walton, 2004).
The persistence of the mixed accounting model in accounting for financial instruments has
historical and political reasons. A fair value approach cannot be derived as such from the
extant IFRS Conceptual Framework. Neither is fair value defined as a measurement base
nor is the market valuation of an entity’s individual components defined as an accounting
objective. Nevertheless, the IASC has proposed a full fair value measurement of financial
instruments already in the early 1990s1. The draft standard on accounting for financial
1 A full fair value option was proposed in the Exposure Drafts E40 and E48 both dealing with accounting
for financial instruments, see Cairns, 2006, p. 15. A mandatory full fair value approach was proposed in
the Discussion Paper "Accounting for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities" issued by the IASC in
March 1997.
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instruments announced by the Joint Working Group of Standard Setters (JWG) in 2000
adopted this proposal. This agreement was particularly justified by the criterion of rele-
vance (Joint Working Group of Standard Setters, 2000, BC1.8) which is one of financial
statements’ qualitative characteristics as defined by, e.g., the IFRS Conceptual Framework
(para. 26). However, the only theoretical concept of relevance the JWG refers to is the
concept of value relevance (Joint Working Group of Standard Setters, 2000, BC1.12). A
measurement base is of higher value relevance than another one if the resulting account-
ing figure is more highly associated with an entity’s stock price or its equity market value
(Barth et al., 2001, p. 79, Holthausen and Watts, 2001, p. 5). Beginning with Barth (1994),
this association was empirically tested for fair values and amortized costs of almost all
kinds of financial instruments. The studies suggest a higher value relevance of fair value
measurement for all instruments except for certain off-balance sheet transactions such as
loan commitments, the market price of which can be hardly estimated. A thorough review
of those studies is presented by Linsmeier et al. (1998). The result cannot be surprising
since an entity’s market price will naturally reflect changes in market prices of securities
held by the entity, all other factors held constant and given efficient capital markets on
which both the entity’s equity shares and the securities held by it are traded. Unlike for
intangible assets (see Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 2006), the latter precondition will be at
least partly fulfilled for many financial instruments.
The standard setters’ reference to these results implies a dominant accounting objective
of equity valuation (see Holthausen and Watts, 2001, p. 22 et seq.) which is (for good
reasons) not stated as such either by the JWG or by the IASB. The existence of alternative
accounting objectives has driven dissent with the full fair value approach. The dissent
was mainly due to two economic consequences of the approach that were neglected by
the standard setters. First, banking institutions feared high implementation costs as the
internal measurement of financial instruments not held for trading was regularly not based
on fair value estimations and fair values were thus not readily available in the absence of
quotations on active markets (Joint Working Group of Standard Setters, 2000, BC1.10,
see also Gebhardt et al., 2004, p. 365). Second, regulating institutions feared an increase
in earnings volatility resulting in an instability of capital markets (ECB, 2004, p. 69,
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see also Walton, 2004, p. 6). The dissent suggests that equity valuation is, if at all, only
one among other accounting objectives a standard setter needs to focus on. It is therefore
questionable whether the theoretical basis the JWG’s draft standard refers to is sufficiently
broad. In the political process following the proposals of the JWG and the preliminary
introduction of a fair value option into IAS 39 in 2003, the full fair value approach was in-
deed restricted. Instead, the extant IAS 39 can be described as a mixed accounting model
simultaneously based on amortized cost and fair value measurement. From a normative
perspective, the standard can neither be classified as a consistent asset and liability ap-
proach nor as a consistent revenue and expense approach.
The measurement of non-contingent derivatives makes up only one inconsistency. In ac-
cordance with the accounting policy chosen, the non-contingent derivative and its replica-
tion are further disclosed under different labels, i.e. prescribed categories, on the balance
sheet and in the notes. This inconsistent treatment might contradict the call for decision
usefulness of accounting information as proclaimed by the IFRS framework. To sup-
port this notion, we will establish two lines of argumentation. First, we outline what
we call the conventional argument, namely that discretion in the choice of accounting
method provides management with leeway for opportunistic earnings management. We
call it conventional because extant literature proposing accounting principles for finan-
cial derivatives regularly refers to management’s possibilities to mislead investors (see
for example Benston and Mian, 1995, p. 239, Woods and Marginson, 2004, p. 388). Sec-
ond, we develop the behavioral argument, i.e. that the different disclosure, resulting from
the choice of accounting method, might induce a biased risk perception of individual in-
vestors. This perspective as such is not a new one. It has been taken in an early discussion
of the impact of accounting information on individual perceptions by Hopwood, 1974,
p. 151 et seq., in a general discussion of biases in risk perceptions of investors by Hodder
et al. (2001) and it is confirmed by evidence from experimental studies on how investors
perceive the risk of financial instruments depending on the way those instruments are
presented (see Koonce et al., 2005a,b, 2006; Weber et al., 2005). New to our approach
is the diligent application of this evidence on existing accounting rules, in particular on
the specific disclosure categories for financial instruments prescribed by the IFRS. Our
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findings have implications for both standard setting and future research. On the one hand,
we suggest how the mixed accounting model under the extant IAS 39 and IFRS 7 evokes
biases in investors’ and analysts’ risk perception. This provides clues for a revision of the
accounting standards for financial instruments. On the other hand, we clearly outline the
assumptions our suggestion is based on. Therefrom, we derive a framework of hypotheses
that could be used as the basis for future research.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show how non-contingent fi-
nancial derivatives are measured and disclosed under the mixed accounting model. This
allows us to explicitly outline our research questions. In Sections 3 and 4, we discuss
those questions first from the conventional and then from the behavioral perspective. Sec-
tion 5 gives a summary.
2 The inconsistency in accounting for non-contingent derivatives: Re-
search questions
A swap agreement as an example of a non-contingent derivative
The IAS 39 accounting rules hold for all financial derivatives regardless of their economic
characteristics. In general financial derivatives can be characterized as contingent or non-
contingent, depending on whether future cash flows are contingent on the exercise of an
optional right by one contractual party. Connoting examples for non-contingent financial
derivatives are interest rate swap agreements or forward contracts to purchase some finan-
cial asset such as an equity share. By means of an interest rate swap agreement, an entity
seeks to achieve an exchange of payments if it has the intention to transfer a fixed interest
payment (either to be received or payable) into a variable one. Under the conditions of a
swap agreement one party has the periodical obligation to pay a fixed amount, tantamount
to a fixed rate on a notional nominal value, and the right to receive in return a payment that
varies with a market interest rate on the identical notional value. The nominal amounts
are notional in nature because they are, for reasons of simplification, neither exchanged
at contract inception nor at maturity. There will only be an upfront payment at contract
inception if the present value of the variable cash flows does not exactly outweigh the
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present value of the fixed cash flows.
When analyzing the cash flow structure of a swap agreement, an interest rate swap can be
viewed as a compound instrument of two separate contracts of the same maturity. The net
cash flows of this swap agreement can be replicated by entering into one contract of the
same characteristics as a classic fixed-rate debt instrument with a fixed interest payment
that is equal to the fixed leg of the swap agreement and into another contract of the same
characteristics as a classic variable-rate debt instrument. The net cash flows are exactly
alike to those of an interest rate swap if the entity is borrower in the one contract and
creditor in the other contract. Both contracts are non-derivative in nature. The economic
characteristics of the swap agreement and its separate non-derivative components only
differ in the counterparty risk. The counterparty risk arising from an interest rate swap is
lower than the risk from a receivable under a debt contract. The difference in counterparty
risk is due to the structure of the swap market where brokers guarantee payments (Hull,
2006, p. 153) and to the fact that nominal amounts are not exchanged between the two
parties of the swap agreement. A separate debt contract, on the other hand, is regularly
not institutionalized and in addition, a risk of a default on the repayment of a contract’s
nominal amount exists. Minton (1997) shows that this difference is not negligible.
Accounting for the swap agreement under IAS 39’s mixed accounting model
Both a non-contingent derivative contract and a non-derivative contract are within the
scope of IAS 39 (as regards recognition and measurement) and of IFRS 7 (as regards
disclosure) if they qualify as financial instruments, i.e. if the terms of contract are in ac-
cordance with IAS 32.11. A non-contingent derivative meets these specific criteria if it re-
sults in the exchange of financial assets and so does a debt contract that consists of a right
to receive financial assets, on the one hand, and of an obligation to deliver those assets, on
the other hand2. A non-contingent derivative further meets the (legal) definition criteria
of derivatives according to IAS 39.9. The definition as a derivative irrefutably results in a
2 A commodity forward can be replicated by a credit-financed commodity purchase. But as a commodity
is not a financial instrument, a commodity forward is an example of a non-contingent derivative non-
replicable by financial instruments according to IAS 39.
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classification as held for trading with accounting consequences being definite. The instru-
ment has to be measured at fair value through profit or loss (IAS 39.46 and 39.55 (a)) and
the classification as held for trading is to be separately disclosed either on the face of the
balance sheet or in the notes (see IFRS 7.8)3. This balance sheet presentation according
to measurement categories is an explicit delineation from the JWG proposal to present
financial instruments according to their type. Under the latter approach, a swap agree-
ment would be presented as such on the balance sheet (Joint Working Group of Standard
Setters, 2000, para. 135)4.
In the case that cash flows of a non-contingent derivative are replicated by two or more
individual contracts, accounting for those equivalent contracts is only identical to any
derivative if all contracts have the same counterparty with whom a netting agreement
holds (IAS 39.IG B.6). In all other cases and in spite of the cash flow equivalency, ac-
counting is different from derivatives. A classification as held for trading is not mandatory
unless there is evidence of recent actual trading. Measurement at fair value (through profit
or loss) is thus only one possible accounting choice that can be applied when an entity
finds some accounting mismatch that can be reduced by fair value measurement. Non-
objectifiable proof of such an accounting mismatch that any entity will easily find is the
only prerequisite for the use of this fair value option (Wüstemann and Bischof (2007)).
If an entity does not opt for fair value measurement affecting the income, there are two
more accounting choices. First, any financial contract that is an asset can be classified as
available for sale and thus be measured at fair value with gains and losses not recognized
in profit or loss but directly in equity (see IAS 39.46 and 39.55 (b)). The classification
as available for sale is also to be disclosed separately (see IFRS 7.8 (d)). Second, a con-
tract that is not an equity instrument can be classified as loans and receivables if it is
an asset not quoted in an active market, as held to maturity if it is an asset with fixed
3 The accounting practice of European banks is in fact very diverse. Some banks, such as the French BNP
Paribas or Crédit Agricole, do not split up the category of financial assets at fair value through profit or
loss on the face of the balance sheet but in the notes. Other banks, such as the Swiss Julius Baer or the
Dutch Rabobank present their non-derivative trading assets and their derivatives in separate line items
on the face of the balance sheet.
4 The JWG approach is still applied by some European banks such as the Danish Danske Bank or the
Swedish Nordea.
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maturity and quoted in an active market, or as other liability, and it can in each case
be measured at amortized cost using the effective interest method. Accounting for the
replicative contracts, therefore, varies with the type of non-contingent derivative. Offset-
ting debt contracts replicating an interest rate swap, for example, can be either measured
at amortized cost (if the contractual rights are classified as held to maturity or loans and
receivables, respectively if the contractual obligations are classified as other liabilities5.)
or at fair value, if the fair value option is used. In addition, the contractual right could also
be measured at fair value directly through equity if it was classified as available for sale.
The choice of a measurement base has further implications on the structure of disclosures
in the notes. Mandatory disclosure of fair values and credit risk for example needs to
be structured by classes of financial instruments (see IFRS 7.26 and 7.36). In turn, the
minimum requirement for how these classes shall be distinguished is the measurement
base (see IFRS 7.B2). Thus, additional information on financial instruments is, in gen-
eral, combined with labeling the instrument as part of a class of instruments measured at
fair value or as part of a class of instruments measured at amortized cost. The waiver of a
mandatory fair value measurement for debt contracts is, in particular, due to the political
decision against a full fair value approach when a revised IAS 39 was announced in 2003
(Walton (2004)). Agreement was only on the principle that unexceptionally all derivatives
should be measured at fair value for the related risks being completely shown on the face
of the balance sheet (see IAS 39.BC177 (a)) because derivatives were regarded as one of
the most important factors causing recent bankruptcies. The critical point, therefore, is the
legal definition of a derivative that refers to the initial net investment (see Hague, 2004,
p. 24). A low initial net investment, that is common to financial derivatives, indeed allows
entities the use of derivatives in purely speculative investments by exploiting a leverage
effect. On the other hand, as it was demonstrated above, the same motivation may under-
lie the investment in separate individual contracts which trigger an identical future cash
flow scheme, but only require a low net investment in their economic combination and
not when acquired individually. Except for the very restrictive conditions of IAS 39.IG
5 A floating interest rate loan does explicitly not contain an embedded derivative that has to be accounted
for separately under IAS 39 (see IAS 39.AG33(a)).
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B.6, entities are not obliged to account for those economic units in the same way as for
derivatives.
For the ease of discussion, imagine two entities. Both entities have long-term financial
assets of CU 300 and long-term financial liabilities of CU 400 which are both at fixed
interest rates and which they intend to hold until maturity. The difference of CU 100 be
invested in some short-term financial instrument at the money market. In order to cover
the risk of decreasing interest rates on the money market, Entity A has at t=0 entered into
a fixed-for-variable interest rate swap whereby it agrees to pay the variable interest rate
and receive a fixed rate on the nominal amount of CU 100. Entity B does not face this
risk because it has acquired an additional long-term fixed interest rate financial asset and
issued a variable interest rate liability both at CU 100. We call this combination hence-
forth a swap-equivalent. The balance sheets of both entities at t=0 are shown in figure 1.
They differ only because, at a market price of CU 0, the swap is an off-balance-sheet item
whereas the fixed-rate asset and the variable-rate liability are not.
Figure 1: Balance sheets of Entity A and Entity B as of t = 0
Assets Entity A Liabilities
Current financial assets 100 Non-current liabilities 400
Held-to-maturity financial assets 300
400 400
Assets Entity B Liabilities
Current financial assets 100 Non-current liabilities 500
Other long-term financial assets 100
Held-to-maturity financial assets 300
500 500
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The differences in the accounting results of Entity A and Entity B that are due to the
mixed accounting model will appear at t=1 when the interest rate changes and the swap
now has a market value that is not zero. If we assume a positive market value of CU 10,
entity A reports a profit of CU 10 given that hedge accounting rules are not applied. But
the balance sheets as of t=1 which are shown in figure 2 do not only differ in the profit
figure but also in the line items presented. Entity A now has to present the derivative as
a separate line item (labeled either as derivative or as trading asset measured at fair value
through profit or loss).
Figure 2: Balance sheets of Entity A and Entity B as of t = 1
Assets Entity A Liabilities
Trading assets (at fair value) 10 Non-current liabilities 400
Current financial assets 100 Equity 10
Held-to-maturity financial assets 300
410 410
Assets Entity B Liabilities
Current financial assets 100 Non-current liabilities 500
Other long-term financial assets 100
Held-to-maturity financial assets 300
500 500
At this point, it is important to keep in mind that future cash flows of Entity A and Entity
B only differ in the counterparty risk. In figure 1 and figure 2 however, we are able to find
two differences in the balance sheets of both entities that might have significant impact
on the perception of the entities’ risk. The first difference results from the different mea-
surement bases of derivative and non-derivative instruments, that is Entity A will report
a profit or loss at t=1 whereas Entity B will not. The second difference results from the
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presentation requirements under IFRS 7, that is Entity A will report, either on face of
the balance sheet or in the notes, the use of a financial derivative that is held for trading
and that is measured at fair value whereas Entity B will not. We can derive our research
questions from these two differences:
Research question 1:
If an entity can choose between the risk management strategy of Entity A and the
risk management strategy of Entity B, how is this choice influenced by the conse-
quences that are implied by the different measurement bases associated with each
strategy under the mixed accounting model, i.e. does the mixed accounting model
provide management with leeway for earnings management in this situation?
Research question 2:
If investors are confined to certain boundedly rational behavior and are therefore
not able to identify the similarity of economic risks when the underlying financial
instruments are communicated in different ways, how will the risks Entity A and
Entity B are exposed to be perceived?
3 The conventional argument: Impact of accounting inconsistencies
on earnings management
There is a vast amount of empirical evidence concerning earnings management (Healy
and Wahlen (1999); Nelson et al. (2003); Graham et al. (2005); Roychowdhury (2006)).
While most of the studies concentrate on earnings management by means of financial re-
porting choices, others report earnings management through real activities manipulation.
Which method is chosen for earnings management is largely determined by the dominant
incentive for earnings management in a given situation, whereas the incentives themselves
are not created by the available methods6 but by external factors, such as management
6 A notable exemption is that accounting-based manipulations seem to be regarded as morally and pro-
fessionally inferior to real activities manipulations, so there might be an incentive to avoid accounting-
based manipulations if possible (see Graham et al., 2005, p. 35).
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compensation contracts and career concerns (see Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 375 et seq.,
and Baber et al., 1998, p. 170). In particular, we talk about management contracts that
contain payment components contingent on performance measures, such as accounting
income, or on some measure of company value, such as the stock price. Well documented
incentives are related to exceeding certain earnings thresholds (Barth et al. (1999); Bhojraj
and Libby (2005); Burgstahler and Eames (2006); Dechow and Skinner (2000)), earnings
smoothing (Graham et al. (2005); Dechow and Skinner (2000); Degeorge et al. (1999))
or either the maximization or minimization of accounting income (Healy, 1985, p. 376 et
seq.).
To illustrate this point with respect to the example described above, i.e. the choice be-
tween a non-contingent derivative such as the interest rate swap and a non-derivative
financial instrument with equivalent timing, structure and uncertainty of cash flows such
as the swap-equivalent, imagine a manager with a compensation contract determining that
his remuneration consists of a fixed component and a bonus payment that is contingent on
the profit of the firm. Under this contract, management participates in the firm’s profits
but is shielded against its losses. The widespread application of those contracts is em-
pirically supported for example by Gaver and Gaver (1998). In accordance with agency
theory, we assume the management to be self-interested such that it seeks to maximize
the net present value (NPV) of its expected compensation. The firm’s shareholders on
the other hand are interested in maximizing the firm’s value, i.e. the net present value of
its cash flows, where the gross cash flow before management compensation is, according
to our example, unaffected by the hedging instrument employed if the counterparty risk
of the swap-equivalent is negligible. At the bottom line, any increase in the NPV of the
management’s compensation causes a corresponding decrease in the shareholders’ wealth.
If we change the example to a situation where a bonus is paid only if the positive ac-
counting income exceeds a certain benchmark, the decision becomes less predictable.
According to Healy (1985), the manager now seeks to maximize accounting income only
if that will carry him at least above the threshold. Otherwise he might prefer to minimize
accounting income in order to save earnings for future periods where the threshold is
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within reach. In the first situation, management has a strict incentive to choose the swap
or, in case of the swap-equivalent, to employ the fair value option which IAS 39 offers
for such contract combinations. The reason is that management is shielded against fair
value losses but profits from fair value gains. In our example that means that the NPV of
the management compensation is unaffected by increasing interest rates resulting in fair
value losses of the hedging instrument (be it the swap or the swap-equivalent), whereas it
increases in the case of decreasing interest rates as the resulting fair value gain increases
accounting profit in the first period. In figure 2, only Entity A’s management can report a
gain while Entity B’s management cannot, since it has not applied the fair value option.
The subsequent fair value impairment of the swap in later periods less than reverses the
initial positive effect in terms of NPV since the management of Entity A will not partici-
pate in accounting losses.
Thus, abstracting from all other factors, IAS 39’s mixed accounting model in combina-
tion with management compensation contingent on earnings might lead management to
choose among economically equivalent hedging instruments those that increase their in-
come at the shareholders’ expense, the swap. One might argue that a swap in fact is
economically superior to the swap-equivalent due to its lower transaction cost and lower
counterparty risk, so shareholders should be in favor of its use anyway. With respect to
the costs this is a valid objection, although it might be softened somewhat by the obser-
vation that management would bear at least part of the higher contracting costs resulting
from using the swap-equivalent, while the shareholders alone bear the higher manage-
ment compensation costs.
An opposite effect might however be observed if income smoothing was the dominant
objective of management. In this case, the relatively high income variability induced
by fair value measurement will give an incentive for the use of non-derivative cash flow
equivalents measured at amortized cost or at fair value directly through equity. Whichever
objective dominates management’s behavior, with regard to research question 1 we find
that the inconsistencies in accounting for non-contingent derivatives always allow an ac-
counting policy in accordance with the management’s strategy of maximizing its compen-
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sation. Thus, following an argumentation based on already existing evidence of earnings
management, the inconsistencies are disadvantageous to an entity’s owners. From the
discussion in this section it can at least be concluded that a profit figure determined by
the mixed accounting model according to IAS 39 does not qualify as a useful basis for a
performance-based management compensation.
4 The behavioral argument: Impact of accounting inconsistencies on
risk perception by investors
Review of prior research
The impact of IAS 39 on earnings management stems from the diversity of measurement
bases. The standard’s mixed accounting model, however, does not only affect measure-
ment but also presentation and disclosure of financial instruments. As presentation and
disclosure have a particular impact on the perception of an entity’s risks by individual
investors a critical assessment of the identified accounting inconsistencies from a behav-
ioral perspective suggests itself.
In accordance with capital market theory, the market price of an asset represents the ag-
gregate expectations of all market participants as regards its value. Risk enters into that
assessment in the form of probability-weights attributed to all possible payoffs of the asset
by every market participant. Under the assumption that value expresses utility, economic
decisions should then be made in accordance with expected utility maximization. Exper-
imental research in psychology, finance, and accounting has shown that decision making
or the forming of expectations on the individual level, however, often deviates from the
expected-utility-rule. Hirshleifer (2001) reviews the literature about the influence of in-
vestor psychology on asset pricing and concludes that psychology-based asset-pricing
theory has the potential to explain empirically observable deviations from unbiased asset
pricing7. He explicitly points out misperception of risk as one reason for these deviations.
Arkes (1991) gives an extensive discussion and categorization of such deviations beyond
7 Unbiased pricing implies the derivation of expected values as described at the beginning of this para-
graph.
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capital market considerations. One such category is called association-based errors and
contains judgment errors that result from the automatic and often subconscious inclusion
of associations from semantic memory in decision processes, such as availability or la-
beling effects (see Folkes, 1988 and Levin et al. (1985) for examples).
Availability describes how easily examples of certain events come to mind and it there-
fore affects the probability attached to these events, such that events which are easier to
recall or imagine are judged to be more common (see Hirshleifer, 2001, p. 1524). Several
studies show how availability can be influenced. Folkes (1988) for example shows that
distinctiveness of an item enhances its availability and increases the probability estimate
of events connected to this item. Distinctiveness there is related, among other dimen-
sions, to the event or the item being atypical. For example, product failures of typical
brand products were more distinct than product successes, the reason being that people
encounter far more successes than failures (Folkes, 1988, p. 16). Closely related to the
availability heuristic are labeling effects because labels serve as primes for semantic mem-
ory, i.e. as means to increase availability (see Arkes, 1991; Koonce et al., 2005a,b).
Experimental research in accounting has used labeling effects to explain different recep-
tions of financial statement information, depending on the presentation of the underlying
event. Hopkins (1996) for example provides evidence that the financial statement clas-
sification of hybrid financial instruments affects the stock price judgments of financial
analysts. Maines and McDaniel (2000) demonstrate in a more general setting that in-
vestors’ use of comprehensive income information largely depends on the presentation
format of income. Koonce et al. (2005a) find that labels, attached to financial instruments
with identical underlying net cash flow and risk, influence the risk associated with each
instrument. They explain this effect with the media coverage of losses from certain finan-
cial derivatives, such as swaps, futures and options. The labels ’swap’ and ’hedge’, which
they use in their study, make these negative associations available to (non-professional)
investors and lead to an increased risk perception (Koonce et al., 2005a, p. 875). This re-
sult is conform with Weber et al. (2005) who more generally suggest that risk perception is
significantly affected by an asset’s name. In another study, Koonce et al. (2005b) provide
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a more extensive consideration of the labeling effects on risk perception. According to
their analysis, risk is perceived not only in terms of probabilities and outcomes but also in
cognitive categories, such as catastrophic potential and worry. These additional categories
may lead individuals to overestimate the risk of a financial item and hence underestimate
its value. This effect would obtain if the label used to describe the financial item, e.g. the
balance sheet category, triggers negative rather than positive associations. Also, different
balance sheet categories may cause different associations such that a financial item might
be perceived different in terms of risk, depending on the category it is sorted into.
The mixed accounting model under IAS 39 in the light of prior behavioral findings
Considering these findings, we expect less risk to be associated with non-derivative finan-
cial items than with derivatives, first because the former lack the leverage effect of deriva-
tives, which indeed decreases their catastrophic potential, and second because losses from
non-derivative financial items are not associated with speculation but with normal busi-
ness and thus receive little media attention. Losses from derivatives, on the other hand,
as a result of failed speculation often attain high media coverage and therefore are, in
contrast to the far more common case of successful hedging strategies, highly available8.
Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) find that even managers are aware of investors’ and analysts’
negative associations when confronted with an entity’s use of derivatives. We therefore
conclude that the delineation of IFRS 7 from the JWG’s approach of a balance sheet pre-
sentation according to the type of financial instruments is justified by good reasons. Under
the latter approach, a derivative disclosed as such would directly evoke an association with
negative outcomes. Our conclusion holds even when taking the results of Koonce et al.
(2006) into account who show that investors appreciate the use of derivatives when learn-
ing about the results ex post; the presentation on a balance sheet implies that an entity is
still engaged in derivatives and a balance sheet thus provides investors and analysts with
information on this engagement ex ante.
8 See Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) for a similar assumption. Trombley, 2003, pp. 5-9, Bodnar and
Gebhardt, 1999, p. 154 and Benston and Mian, 1995, p. 219 provide some prominent examples. A
recent example are the loss announcements by Fannie Mae, a US mortgage bank, that were broadly
covered in the news. An article in the WSJ for instance was titled "Fannie revises losses on derivative
contracts" (March 18, 2005, p. A4, see also March 3, 2005, p. A3).
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The presentation of a measurement category (instead of an instrument’s type) under IFRS
7 can, however, be regarded as a periphrasis of an instrument’s type. The classification
actually emphasizes the two purposes of an entity’s use of financial instruments that were
identified in the first part of this paper. The category labeled as held for trading obviously
refers to a short-term speculative purpose. The other categories labeled as available for
sale, held to maturity, loans and receivables, or other liabilities refer to a longer-term hold-
ing (or hedging) purpose. If it was now cognitively available to investors that short-term
trading portfolios regularly consist of financial derivatives exploiting the leverage effect,
it could be argued that investors faced with a balance sheet category labeled as held for
trading would undergo a reaction similar to investors faced with a balance sheet category
labeled as derivatives9. The same argument might hold as regards the alternative classifi-
cation of financial instruments by measurement base. Reasonable investors with a basic
knowledge of IFRS accounting could readily be aware of the IASB’s repeatedly and pub-
licly stated objective to measure at least those instruments at fair value that are exposed to
short-term market risk, and that in particular unexceptionally all financial derivatives are
regarded to be of that ilk.
When we apply our conclusions on the accounting rules for non-contingent financial
derivatives according to IFRS, the inconsistencies from a behavioral perspective become
evident as they might induce an unintended risk perception. An entity presenting non-
contingent financial derivatives that are labeled on the balance sheet or in the notes as
being held for trading and as measured at fair value would be perceived to be a riskier
investment than another entity presenting non-derivative financial instruments that are not
labeled as being held for trading and not as measured at fair value. On the one hand, this
result would emphasize that the IASB had met its objective of providing information on
the underlying risk of financial instruments by presenting them in separate groups on the
balance sheet and in the notes. On the other hand however, the resulting risk perception
might be flawed since we could demonstrate in our example that a combination of non-
9 In fact, the question about the cognitive association between trading and speculation has already been
raised by Young, 1996, p. 507.
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derivative financial instruments with equivalent cash flows to a swap and which is not
mandatorily measured at fair value might be riskier than a comparable interest rate swap
agreement due to the differences in counterparty risk. The presentation and the disclosure
of financial instruments by measurement category and by measurement base according to
IAS 39 and IFRS 7 would thus result in a bias of investor’s risk perception such that in-
vestments which are riskier compared to equivalents would actually be perceived as being
less risky. This will in turn alter an entity’s capital costs.
Getting back to the example described above, Entity B would be perceived as being less
risky than Entity A which is presenting trading assets measured at fair value on the face
of its balance sheet, even though Entity B faces a counterparty risk in excess of the coun-
terparty risk born by Entity A. With regard to research question 2, our discussion thus
suggests that there is a bias in the perception of the risks Entity A and Entity B are ex-
posed to.
Possibilities for future research
There are two assumptions with regard to the behavior of investors and analysts underly-
ing our conclusion that both deserve further attention. The first assumption is that a class
of financial instruments presented on the balance sheet or in the notes as being held for
trading (respectively as measured at fair value through profit or loss) will be more likely
associated with speculative trading strategies based on the use of financial derivatives than
classes of financial instruments presented on the balance sheet as being available for sale,
held to maturity, loans and receivables, or other liabilities (respectively as measured at
amortized cost). This assumption could be justified, analogous to the findings of prior
research on the immediate perception of the use of derivatives, by the availability of both
news coverage and investors’ own experience. The use of derivatives in speculative trad-
ing strategies is a regular and prominent topic of magazines covering investment consul-
tancy10. It has been demonstrated that individual investors split up their total investment
10 Some anecdotal evidence will underline this point. The FT for example recently published a report on
the mastering of risk by investors, part 3 of this report was titled "Diversification and derivatives can
both be valuable tools for managing an investment portfolio" (September 23, 2005, p. 2). The Fortune
Magazine published an interview with Leo Melamed, a creator of derivative futures, who emphasized
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portfolio into different so called mental accounts neglecting interdependencies (Thaler
(1980, 1985)) and it can be observed that speculative investments make up one separate
mental account (see Shefrin and Statman, 2000, p. 148 et seq.). On this basis, one can
conclude that individual investors will have their own experience in the composition of
separate trading portfolios and that they are aware of derivatives as a regular component
of those portfolios.
The second assumption is that financial instruments presented on the balance sheet or in
the notes as being held for trading (respectively as measured at fair value) will be judged
as riskier than financial instruments presented on the balance sheet as being available for
sale, held to maturity, loans and receivables, or other liabilities (respectively as measured
at amortized cost). This assumption follows from the first assumption. If a presentation of
financial instruments by measurement category or by measurement base affects the risk
perception by investors in the same way as a balance sheet presentation by type as it was
observed by Koonce et al. (2005a) and Koonce et al. (2005b), we could expect the same
availability effect for instruments labeled as being held for trading or as measured at fair
value. As a result, by recognition of those labels and by immediate association with the
use of derivatives, individuals will have a bias in their judgment of the risk exposure.
These two assumptions are critical with respect to our conclusion on the behavioral effects
of the mixed accounting model for non-contingent financial derivatives according to IFRS.
Therefore, they will serve as a basis for experimental studies with non-professional and
professional investors.
5 Conclusion
(1) According to IAS 39, non-contingent derivatives such as swaps or forwards are mea-
sured at fair value and presented on the balance sheet or in the notes as being held for
trading and as measured at fair value. A combination of non-derivative contracts that re-
that retail investors "find their way" on this market (December 25, 2006, p. 124). The Forbes Magazine,
when it covered the private banking business, stated that once "a millionaire is hooked, a relationship
manager might find him a structured derivative for his finances" (November 28, 2005, p. 147).
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sults in an equivalent timing, structure and uncertainty of cash flows, on the other hand,
offers several different accounting policies. In contrast to derivatives, fair value measure-
ment is not mandatory for those contracts. Instead, measurement at cost or at fair value
through equity is also allowed. The measurement base chosen has further implications on
the label under which the instruments are disclosed as this label needs to refer directly to
the measurement category.
(2) The different accounting policies available for non-derivatives on the one hand and
economically equivalent contracts on the other hand provide management with leeway
to act opportunistically by means of earnings management. Empirical and anecdotal ev-
idence shows that management indeed has incentives for earnings management and acts
accordingly. We show that the accounting problem discussed here provides leeway for
the exercise of both accrual-based earnings management and for earnings management
through real activities manipulation.
(3) Existing experimental evidence suggests that the perception of a financial instruments’
risk significantly relies on its label. Instruments labeled as derivatives for example are reg-
ularly perceived to be riskier than instruments not labeled as derivatives. This insight has
implications for the presentation of financial instruments under IFRS 7. We hypothesize
that a category labeled as held for trading or as measured at fair value will be judged to
contain derivatives in order to earn short-term speculative profit, whereas the other mea-
surement categories will be judged to serve a longer-term holding purpose. As a result,
entities involved in non-contingent derivatives will be perceived to be a riskier investment
than entities involved in a combination of contracts that are equivalent with regard to the
timing, structure and uncertainty of cash flows but even riskier when taking into account
the counterparty’s default.
(4) This paper aims at providing the theoretical framework for future experimental re-
search which tests for biased risk perception related to the different labels prescribed by
IFRS 7. Thereby, one needs to distinguish between the presentation by measurement cat-
egory on the face of the balance sheet and the presentation by measurement base in the
19
notes. The results could serve as a justification for a correction of the identified inconsis-
tency in future standard setting.
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